The secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel under the average total power constraint was recently characterized, independently, by Khisti and Wornell and Oggier and Hassibi using a Sato-like argument and matrix analysis tools. This paper presents an alternative characterization of the secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel under a more general matrix constraint on the channel input using a channel-enhancement argument. This characterization is by nature information-theoretic and is directly built on the intuition regarding to the optimal transmission strategy in this communication scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONSIDER a multiple-antenna wiretap channel with transmit antennas and and receive antennas at the legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper (1) where and are the real channel matrices associated with the legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel matrices and are assumed to be fixed during the entire transmission and are known to all terminals. The additive noise and are Gaussian vectors with zero mean and identity covariance matrices and are independent across the time index . The channel input satisfies an average total power constraint (2) The secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel is defined as the maximum rate of communication such that the information can be decoded arbitrarily reliably at the legitimate recipient but cannot be inferred at any positive rate at the eavesdropper [1] , [2] . An illustration of this communication scenario is shown in Fig. 1 For a general discrete memoryless wiretap channel with transition probability , a single-letter expression for the secrecy capacity was obtained by Csiszár and Körner [2] (3)
where is an auxiliary variable satisfying the Markov relation (4) Moreover, the secrecy capacity expression (3) extends to continuous-alphabet problems with average cost constraints. Thus, the problem of characterizing the secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel reduces to evaluating (3) for the specific channel model (1) .
Note that evaluating (3) involves solving a functional (possibly) nonconvex optimization problem. Solving optimization problems of this type usually requires nontrivial techniques and strong inequalities. Indeed, for the single-antenna case , the secrecy capacity expression (3) was successfully evaluated by Leung and Hellman [5] using a result of Wyner [1] on degraded wiretap channels and the celebrated entropy-power inequality [6, Ch. 16.7 ]. 1 Unfortunately, the same approach does not extend to the multiple-antenna case, as the latter in its general form belongs to the class of nondegraded wiretap channels. The problem of characterizing the secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel was open until the recent work of Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] . The special cases when 1) , ; and 2)
, and arbitrary were independently settled by Shafiee et al. [8] and Khisti et al. [9] , respectively. In their respective work, Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] followed an indirect approach to evaluate the secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel (1) . Key to their evaluations is the following genie-aided upper bound:
1 Alternatively, it can also be evaluated using Wyner's result [1] and a classical result from estimation theory via a relationship between mutual information and minimum mean-squared error estimate [7] . 0018-9448/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE where (5) follows from the Markov relation (4) . Furthermore, Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] noticed that the original objective of optimization depends on the channel transition probability only through its marginals and , whereas the objective function in the upper bound (6) does depend on the joint conditional . Therefore, the upper bound (6) can be further improved as (7) for any joint conditional such that and . Note that the upper bound on the right-hand side of (7) has a specific meaning: It is the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel where the legitimate recipient has access to both and , minimized over all possible correlations between and . In essence, this is very similar to the Sato upper bound [10] on the sum capacity of a general broadcast channel. For the multiple-antenna wiretap channel (1), Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] showed that for a given jointly Gaussian , the conditional mutual information is maximized when the channel input is Gaussian. Therefore, the upper bound in the right-hand side of (6) can be written as a matrix optimization problem (8) where is Gaussian with zero mean and covariance matrix with and is Gaussian with zero mean and joint covariance matrix with
Here, denotes the identity matrix of size , and denotes an order between two real symmetric matrices such that means that is positive semidefinite. On the other hand, by letting be Gaussian with zero mean and covariance matrix in (3), it is easy to see that the following secrecy rate is achievable: (9) Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] compared the value of the optimization problems (8) and (9) and showed that they are identical, thus establishing the optimality of both matrix characterizations. Operationally, Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] showed that the original multiple-antenna wiretap channel (1) has the same secrecy capacity as when the legitimate recipient has access to both received signals, minimized over all possible correlations between them. Considering the disparity between these two physical scenarios, this is a rather surprising result.
The approach of Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] also reminded us of the degraded-same-marginal bound [11] , [12] for the capacity region of the multiple-antenna broadcast channel. There, the optimality of Gaussian codebooks is hard to come by and a precise characterization of the capacity region had to wait until the proposal of a very different approach by Weingarten et al. [13] . Motivated by [13] , this paper presents a different approach to characterize the secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel under a more general matrix constraint on the channel input. Compared with that of Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] , our approach is by nature information-rather than matrix-theoretic and is directly built on the intuition regarding the optimal transmission strategy in this communication scenario.
II. CAPACITY CHARACTERIZATION VIA A CHANNEL-ENHANCEMENT ARGUMENT
To characterize the secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel (1), we will first consider the special case where the channel matrices and are square and invertible. In this case, the channel model (1) can be equivalently written as (10) where and are additive Gaussian noise vectors with zero means and covariance matrices and respectively and are independent across the time index . Note that the noise covariance matrices and are (strictly) positive definite. In this paper, the channel model (10) is referred to as vector Gaussian wiretap channel. Rather than the average total power constraint (2), we will consider a matrix constraint on the channel input (11) where is a positive semidefinite matrix of size . As shown in [13, Lemma 1] , the matrix constraint (11) is a more general constraint which subsumes the average total power constraint (2) as a special case.
Next, we will first focus on the vector Gaussian wiretap channel under the matrix constraint and provide a precise characterization of the secrecy capacity. We will then extend the result, through a limiting argument, to the more general multiple-antenna case under both matrix and average total power constraints.
A. Vector Gaussian Wiretap Channel
Let us first consider the case where the vector Gaussian wiretap channel is degraded. The following result is a natural extension of Leung and Hellman [5] on the scalar Gaussian wiretap channel.
Theorem 1 (Degraded Vector Gaussian Wiretap Channel):
The secrecy capacity of the vector Gaussian wiretap channel (10) with degradedness order (12) under the matrix constraint (11) is given by (13) Proof: Under the assumption (12), the vector Gaussian wiretap channel (10) is (stochastically) degraded. For degraded wiretap channels, Wyner [1] showed that is optimal in the single-letter secrecy capacity expression (3) . Thus, the secrecy capacity of the vector Gaussian wiretap channel (10) is given by (14) Let be a Gaussian vector with zero mean and covariance matrix . Assuming that is independent of and , we have
where (15) follows from the worst additive noise result of Diggavi and Cover [14, Lemma II.2] . Substituting (16) into (14) completes the proof of the theorem.
Next, we use a channel-enhancement argument to lift the result of Theorem 1 to the general case. Channel-enhancement argument was first introduced by Weingarten et al. [13] to characterize the capacity region of the multiple-antenna broadcast channel with private messages. Proper modifications are made to fit our purposes here. The difference between the channel-enhancement argument here and that of Weingarten et al. [13] will be discussed in the next section. The main result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (General Vector Gaussian Wiretap Channel):
The secrecy capacity of the general vector Gaussian wiretap channel (10) under the matrix constraint (11) is given by (17) Proof: Let be an optimal solution to the matrix optimization problem on the right-hand side of (17 
B. Multiple-Antenna Wiretap Channel
Finally, We extend the secrecy capacity result of Theorem 2 for the general vector Gaussian wiretap channel to the multiple-antenna wiretap channel. The main ideas of the proof are borrowed from [13, Sec.V-B] with proper adaptations.
Theorem 3 (Multiple-Antenna Wiretap Channel):
The secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel (1) under the matrix constraint (11) is given by (36) Proof: By choosing to be Gaussian in (3), it is clear that the secrecy rate is achievable for any . We therefore concentrate on proving the converse result. As mentioned previously, the case when both channel matrices and are square and invertible can be easily transformed into a vector Gaussian wiretap channel and thus Theorem 2 completes the proof. Our goal next is to approximate a multiple-antenna wiretap channel with general channel matrices by one with invertible channel matrices.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the channel matrices and are square (but not necessarily invertible). If that is not the case, we can use singular value decomposition (SVD) to show that there is an equivalent channel which does have square channel matrices. That is, we may find a new channel with square channel matrices which are derived from the original ones via matrix multiplications. The new channel is equivalent to the original one in preserving the secrecy capacity under the same input constraint. Consider using SVD to write the channel matrices as follows: and where , , , and are orthogonal matrices, and and are diagonal. We now define a new multiple-antenna wiretap channel which has invertible channel matrices (37) where and for some . Note that the multiple-antenna wiretap channel (37) does have invertible channel matrices. Therefore, the secrecy capacity, , under the matrix constraint (11) also forms a Markov chain. Therefore, both the legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper receive a better signal in the new channel (37) than in the original channel (1) . Unlike the private message problem considered in [13] , here the enhancement of both channels does not necessarily lead to an increase in secrecy capacity. However, we can bound the difference between the secrecy capacity of the original multiple-antenna wiretap channel (1) and of the new multiple-antenna wiretap channel (37) under the same matrix constraint (11) This is the desired converse result, which completes the proof of the theorem.
The following corollary, which characterizes the secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel under the average total power constraint, is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3 and [13, Lemma 1].
Corollary 1 ([3], [4]):
The secrecy capacity of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel (1) under the average total power constraint (2) is given by (48)
III. INTUITIONS ON THE ENHANCED CHANNEL
In this paper, our approach of characterizing the secrecy capacity of the vector Gaussian wiretap channel hinges on the existence of the enhanced channel which needs to satisfy the following conditions: 1) it is degraded, so the secrecy capacity can be readily characterized as in Theorem 1; and 2) it has the same secrecy capacity as the original wiretap channel. A priori, it is not clear whether such an enhanced channel would always exist, letting alone actually construct one.
Our intuition regarding the existence of the enhanced channel was mainly from the parallel Gaussian wiretap channel model, which can be seen as a special case of the vector Gaussian wiretap channel with diagonal noise covariance matrices. For the parallel Gaussian wiretap channel, it was shown in [15] , [16] that the optimal transmission strategy is to transmit independently over the subchannels for which the legitimate recipient receives a better signal than the eavesdropper. Therefore, an enhanced channel can be constructed by reducing the noise variances for the legitimate recipient in each of the subchannels to the noise level of the eavesdropper. Clearly, the enhanced channel so constructed is degraded: the signal received by the legitimate recipient is at least as good as that received by the eavesdropper in each of the subchannels. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity of the enhanced channel is the same as the original channel, as the noise variance for the legitimate recipient does not change at all for any of the "active" subchannels and at the same time the "inactive" subchannels remains "inactive." Therefore, at least for the special case of parallel Gaussian wiretap channel the enhanced channel always exists.
Carrying over to the vector Gaussian wiretap channel, no information should be transmitted along any directions where the eavesdropper observes a stronger signal than the legitimate recipient. (This intuition was separately confirmed by Khisti and Wornell [3] and Oggier and Hassibi [4] .) Thus, the effective channel for the eavesdropper must be degraded with respect to the effective channel for the legitimate recipient. However, in a vector Gaussian wiretap channel, the noise covariance matrices for the legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper may not always have the same eigendirections. Therefore, finding the enhanced channel (by reducing "just" enough the noise covariance for the legitimate recipient) is much more involved than in the parallel case. Our construction in this paper was motivated by the construction of the enhanced channel of Weingarten et al. [13] for the vector Gaussian broadcast channel problem with private messages.
Finally, recall that in their constructions Weingarten et al. [13] enhanced every transmitter-receiver channels (by reducing the corresponding noise covariance). In our construction, however, we only enhanced the channel to the legitimate recipient. (The transmitter-eavesdropper channel remained unchanged, cf. the channel model (26).) This is due to the fact that in both arguments, the enhancement must increase, a priori, the capacity (secrecy or regular) of the channel. (Otherwise, both arguments would break down.) Whereas reducing the noise covariances will benefit all the receivers and hence improve the private message capacity of the vector Gaussian broadcast channel, reducing the noise covariance of the eavesdropper may compromise the security of the transmission scheme and hence lower the secrecy capacity of the vector Gaussian wiretap channel. This is a key difference between the channel enhancement argument here and that of Weingarten et al. [13] for the vector Gaussian broadcast channel problem with private messages. 
